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• Despite its importance as an invest-
ment destination and major exporting
country, China is considerably less
integrated into the global ﬁnancial
system than might be expected.
• The lack of integration stems in part
from China’s focus on its domestic
goals of balancing growth and stability
while it transforms and modernizes its
economy.
• Substantially more ﬁnancial integra-
tion can be expected in coming decades,
however, as China invests more abroad,
develops its domestic ﬁnancial system,
makes its exchange rate more ﬂexible,
and further relaxes its capital controls.
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hina’s global economic signiﬁcance is grow-
ing.  Its gross domestic product (GDP) is the
world’s second largest when measured in
terms of purchasing-power parities, and its
share in world exports is exceeded only by Germany’s
and that of the United States. China is Canada’s sec-
ond-largest trading partner, and trade between the
two countries is continuing to grow rapidly.  China’s
foreign exchange reserves, now totalling US$1.8 tril-
lion, are the world’s largest. Yet China has only a
minor role in the global ﬁnancial system. Its banks,
some of which are the largest in the world by market
capitalization and the size of their balance sheets,
have only a modest international presence. China’s
currency, the renminbi (RMB), also known as the
yuan, is virtually not used outside the country and,
with a few exceptions, Chinese capital markets are not
a source of ﬁnancing for foreign borrowers.
China’s lack of integration into the global ﬁnancial
system needs to be understood primarily in the con-
text of China’s own interests and domestic policy pri-
orities. The central economic goal of the Chinese
authorities has been to achieve growth with stability
while radically restructuring the industrial sector and
creating enough jobs each year to absorb layoffs and
large numbers of new entrants into the labour force.
China has been generally successful in meeting these
challenges, and during the past 30 years economic
growth has averaged nearly 10 per cent annually.
Structural and institutional reforms to free up market
forces and promote efﬁciency are introduced gradu-
ally, with initial experimentation followed by adop-
tion on a national scale. Industrial enterprise reforms
in the late 1990s were initially experimental, followed
by radical nationwide restructuring and privatization.
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Modernizing the state-owned banking system that
dominates China’s ﬁnancial system began gradually
in the late 1990s as a ﬁrst step along the path towards
a sound and diverse set of intermediaries and capital
market institutions.
Thus, opening ﬁnancial markets and integrating
China’s economy into the global ﬁnancial system has
not been a high priority in the past. As the Chinese
economy matures, however, and as reforms strengthen
the domestic financial system, China will become more
important in global ﬁnancial markets. Changes are
already occurring as China’s ﬁnancial might is being
channelled towards overseas investments and as pop-
ular pressures develop for a loosening of capital con-
trols. The authorities have committed themselves to
greater exchange rate ﬂexibility, and this would also
facilitate integration into the global ﬁnancial system,
while allowing continued policy focus on domestic
priorities.
Our purpose here is to review the ways in which
China is, and is not, integrated into the global ﬁnan-
cial system. We begin by describing the current situa-
tion and the forces that are leading to a more important
role for China in world ﬁnance. This is followed by a
review of China’s financial system, its linkages abroad,
and its current exchange rate regime. We conclude
with observations on China’s future direction.
China’s Capital Account
Since its accession to the World Trade Organization
(WTO) in 2001, China has become one of the world’s
principal destinations for foreign direct investment
(FDI); inflows have almost doubled since then, reaching
nearly US$80 billion in recent years.1  China’s capital
account is indicative of its links with the rest of the
world. FDI is thus the major channel by which China
accesses international capital markets. As shown in
Chart 1, net FDI inﬂows have been relatively stable
around an increasing trend over at least the past decade.
In contrast, securities investments and other forms of
capital ﬂows have, until recently, been relatively small
on a net basis, and have not been consistently positive
or negative.
FDI inflows result from a deliberate policy to modernize
Chinese industry by encouraging overseas Chinese
and others to invest in China, first in the Special
1.   Note that Chinese ﬁgures for direct investment are higher than those
produced by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD), and that different Chinese sources have differing estimates
of the extent of FDI. See UNCTAD (2007).
Economic Zones (SEZs) and then extending to the rest of
thecountry.ThefirstSEZwasestablishedinGuangdong
in 1979.2  SEZs, like export-processing zones in other
countries, allow duty-free imports of inputs, and free-
dom from export or sales taxes; moreover, they typi-
cally provide infrastructure for enterprises to operate
and lower tax rates, thus offering incentives for new
investment, whether domestic or foreign. In addition,
as enclaves within the still centrally planned economy,
SEZs served as “laboratories” for experiments with
economic reforms where the Chinese authorities could
adopt more market-based regulations and use proﬁt
as an incentive without completely overhauling the
economy and exposing it to world competition.
FDI inﬂows result from a deliberate
policy to modernize Chinese industry
by encouraging overseas Chinese
and others to invest in China.
Guangdong, as the initial beneﬁciary, also beneﬁtted
from its proximity to Hong Kong. Strong production
links have since developed between Hong Kong and
2.   SEZs, and a variant known as Economic and Technological Development
Zones, now number over a hundred. See Naughton (2007).
Chart 1






Source: China, SAFE = State Administration of Foreign



















500,00019 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SUMMER 2008
the entire Pearl River Delta as the SEZs were extended
throughout the Delta region. Over time, and with fur-
ther liberalization and the creation of new investment
zones, multinational companies from North America,
Europe, and elsewhere in Asia became substantial
investors, attracted by the size of China’s domestic
market and the cost savings from moving manufactur-
ing and assembly to a low-wage country with a vast
pool of labour. As a result, the investment zones have
industrialized quickly and have attracted substantial
numbers of migrants from other parts of China.
China has benefitted from the expertise and technology
associated with foreign investment, while the SEZs
have provided a model for the more gradual liberali-
zation of the rest of the Chinese economy. A less
important advantage has been access to foreign ﬁnan-
cial resources per se, since China’s domestic saving
rate has been very high (over 50 per cent at present),
and China has been running a substantial current
account surplus, not a deﬁcit, with huge reserves
accumulating. To try to moderate the future trend in
the balance-of-payments surplus, the Chinese govern-
ment has encouraged Chinese investment abroad.
Thus, outward FDI rose from US$6.3 billion in 2002 to
US$27 billion in 2006. Nevertheless, China’s net FDI
liabilities are still far in excess of its foreign assets,
while net stocks of securities and other asset catego-
ries are much smaller (Table 1). All are dwarfed, how-
ever, by China’s massive ofﬁcial reserves, which by
mid-2008 exceeded US$1.8 trillion.
Chinese investment links with
Hong Kong, Korea, and its other Asian
neighbours are of prime importance.
China accounted for 5.3 per cent of world FDI inﬂows
in 2006, roughly equal to the share of Belgium, Canada,
or France, and far higher than that of Germany, Italy,
India, or Singapore. In contrast, its outward invest-
ment accounts for only 0.6 per cent of the world total.
The destinations of those outﬂows also differ mark-
edly from the world average. Most global FDI ﬂows
(84 per cent) go to developed countries, with the bal-
ance (16 per cent) going to developing countries.3
China’s outward FDI, however, is channelled
3.   See UNCTAD (2007). Developing countries include Eastern Europe and
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).
overwhelmingly to developing countries (all but 6 per
cent, with 2 per cent each accounted for by North
America and Europe), and most going to Hong Kong
and the Cayman Islands, which each receive about
35 per cent of the total. While the role of the latter as
an offshore financial centre makes it likely that the
FDI is destined for other countries, it is nevertheless
notable that, for all the publicity given to China’s
investments in North America, Europe, and Africa,
these destinations account for only a modest amount
of Chinese investments. Instead, Chinese investment
links with Hong Kong, Korea, and its other Asian
neighbours are of prime importance.
Despite its relatively modest size, Chinese FDI outside
of Asia has attracted considerable media and govern-
mental attention, which can be traced to at least three
principal concerns. First, because the purchases of
foreign assets are by Chinese state-owned enterprises
or agencies charged with investing ofﬁcial reserves,
there is a fear that non-commercial motives may drive
investment decisions. For instance, stakes in natural
resource companies may be acquired, in part to allow
China to gain access to resources for geo-strategic
reasons. Second, Chinese investments in Africa, in
particular, are seen as undercutting conditions of good
governance generally imposed by Western govern-
ments and international ﬁnancial institutions, thus
propping up corrupt and undemocratic regimes. Third,
given the size of the economy and its massive ﬁnan-
cial resources, the potential size of future Chinese
acquisitions, rather than their current importance,
seems to fan public concern. The Chinese government
could afford to acquire some of the world’s largest
multinational corporations if it chose to use even a
portion of its US$1.8 trillion in reserves in this way.
Another area of interest is recent investments
by Chinese financial institutions in listed foreign
Table 1
China’s Foreign Assets and Liabilities
FDI FDI Net Net Other Ofﬁcial Overall
assets liabili- FDI secu- net reserves net
ties stock rities foreign
assets
2004 52,700 369,000 -316,300 35,400 -44,900 618,600 292,800
2005 64,500 471,500 -407,000 40,100 -36,200 825,700 422,600
2006 90,600 612,500 -521,900 108,500 -48,100 1,072,900 611,400
2007 107,600 742,400 -634,800 96,900 25,100 1,534,900 1,022,100
Source: China, State Administration of Foreign Exchange, downloaded from
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having governance problems, for at least two reasons.
The “curse of oil” often produces governments where
rent-seeking and corruption are rampant, and China,
as a latecomer in the acquisition of sources of supply,
most easily ﬁnds opportunities with pariah states
with which Western governments discourage contact.
Its dealings with these states have been facilitated by
its doctrine of non-interference in other countries’ sov-
ereignty—a policy that resonates with African coun-
tries that have suffered from colonialism. China has
not escaped blame from Africans themselves, how-
ever, because China’s actions undercut efforts to
improve governance, for instance, in the context of
NEPAD.5China’scontinuinginvolvementwithAfrican
countries has led it to modify its indifference towards
governance failures and civil rights abuses. After
years of unqualiﬁed support, the Chinese government
recently condemned the actions of the Sudanese gov-
ernment with respect to the country’s rebels in Darfur
and has made contributions to the African Union’s
peacekeeping force there. Chinese officials are also
increasingly distancing themselves from the govern-
ment of Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe (Alden 2007).
Available data are mixed on whether Chinese involve-
ment has reduced corruption, or instead, added to
governance problems (Reisen and Ndoye 2008, 30).
Portfolio capital ﬂows are subject to various restric-
tions, but there has been a trend towards their liberali-
zation. They are still largely channelled through large
institutional investors using the QFII and QDII pro-
grams.6 When China joined the WTO, the government
committed to opening its securities markets to foreign
investors.7 In December 2002, the Qualiﬁed Foreign
Institutional Investor (QFII) program was introduced.
Firms that meet the requirements can invest in various
domestic ﬁnancial instruments in China, such as treas-
uries, convertible bonds, corporate bonds, and A shares,
which are common shares registered in Mainland
China and denominated in yuan.8 The program offers
many beneﬁts by introducing additional competition
5.  The New Partnership for African Development, an initiative of the presi-
dents of Nigeria, Senegal, and South Africa, attempts to exert peer pressure to
improve governance and economic policies.
6.   Qualiﬁed Foreign Institutional Investors and Qualiﬁed Domestic Institu-
tional Investors, respectively.
7.   Foreign security ﬁrms were to be permitted to engage directly in trading
B shares, and foreigners were to be permitted to establish joint-venture secu-
rity and funds-management companies. B shares trade and are settled in for-
eign currencies (in U.S. dollars on the Shanghai market, and in Hong Kong
dollars on the Shenzen market) but are otherwise identical to A shares.
8.   Neftci and Ménager-Xu (2007) provide a fuller description of China’s
ﬁnancial markets.
companies.4 To date, these purchases have usually
involved minority stakes (except for the investments
in Asia), and in several cases (like Blackstone), the
Chinese acquirer has explicitly stated that the acquisi-
tion was made for investment purposes and that it
would not attempt to inﬂuence company policy. But a
precedent of sorts exists. The Industrial and Commer-
cial Bank of China’s purchase of a 20 per cent stake in
Standard Bank of South Africa, Africa’s largest bank, is
intended to serve as foundation for ICBC to become a
global bank, according to its chairman. The strategy
of passive investing in European and American com-
panies may have been influenced by the unsuccessful
attempt by China National Offshore Oil Company
(CNOOC) to acquire outright the U.S. petroleum
company Unocal in 2005 for US$18.5 billion. Congres-
sional scrutiny and the threat that the takeover would
be blocked by the Bush administration led CNOOC to
withdraw its offer.
In Africa, Chinese investments have often involved
government-to-government deals, with China typi-
cally acquiring rights to exploit natural resources in
exchange for concessional loans and Chinese assist-
ance in building infrastructure or providing social
services (Alden 2007). Thus, China has provided
ﬁnancial assistance to the Sudanese government and
is the country’s largest investor, while the China
National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) owns the
biggest share of Sudan’s largest oil venture—a share
giving it 150,000 barrels per day—in the southern part
of the country. CNPC has helped to construct a pipe-
line to the Red Sea and an oil reﬁnery in Khartoum.
Similarly, China has accessed oil reserves in Nigeria
and Angola, and mineral deposits in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo and Zambia. In these deals, the
aid and commercial elements of ﬁnancing are difﬁcult
to distinguish. When projects are ﬁnanced in “Angola
mode,” funds are not directly loaned to the recipient
country; instead, the Chinese government will man-
date a Chinese construction company to carry out a
project, often with assistance from the Export-Import
Bank of China. In exchange, a Chinese natural
resources company will receive oil or mineral rights
(Reisen and Ndoye 2008).
When it is making investments in mineral-rich African
countries, China seems to deal primarily with regimes
4.   Some of these investments will ﬁgure in portfolio outﬂows, rather than
direct investment, since the latter includes only stakes that exceed a threshold
percentage of an existing company or allow the investor an effective voice in
its management. Chinese data are based on a 25 per cent threshold, not the
10 per cent that is the international standard.21 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SUMMER 2008
in China’s securities markets, enabling the transfer of
foreign expertise, promoting a more effective alloca-
tion of Chinese savings, and increasing the attractive-
ness of Chinese securities for foreign investors.9
The QFII program is restricted to funds-management
and securities companies with at least US$10 billion
under management, and to the world’s top 100 com-
mercial banks.10 As well, the securities regulator of
their home country must have signed a Memorandum
of Understanding and maintained a good relationship
with the China Securities Regulatory Commission
(CSRC).11
China has also moderately eased
its controls on capital outﬂows.
China has also moderately eased its controls on capi-
tal outﬂows. In August 2004, the CSRC certiﬁed its ini-
tial Qualified Domestic Institutional Investors (QDIIs).
Chinese insurance companies with assets of over ﬁve
billion RMB are now permitted to invest up to 80 per
cent of their foreign exchange funds in overseas capi-
tal markets, with some limitations. Individuals have
been unable to purchase assets abroad, but the State
Administration of Foreign Exchange announced in
August 2007 that domestic investors would be permit-
ted to open accounts with the Tianjin branch of the
Bank of China to trade securities listed on the Hong
Kong market, with extension to other banks to fol-
low.12 This decision was later reversed by Premier
Wen, on two grounds: ﬁrst, that the anticipated ﬂows
of funds might swamp the Hong Kong financial market,
and second, that the proposal needed to be restruc-
tured.13 Despite the strict controls, there is some evi-
dence that investors are evading them. In particular,
9.  The opening of China’s capital markets to foreign investors has followed
China’s traditionally cautious approach to reform, what Deng Xiaoping
termed “crossing the river by feeling the stones.”
10.  As of the summer of 2007, 52 foreign institutions and four foreign banks
had been licensed as custodian banks. See the  CSRC website at
<http:  //211.154.210.238/en/homepage/index_en.jsp>.
11. The CSRC is the executive arm of the State Council Securities Committee,
which was established in 1992 to regulate China’s securities and futures markets.
12.  “China Allows Direct Offshore Investments,” Financial Times, 21 August
2007, p. 3.
13.  One of its alleged flaws was that it amounted to “one bank, one city, one
market,” raising bureaucratic and jurisdictional objections (“Chinese Plan to Allow
Purchase of Hong Kong Shares Put on Ice,” Financial Times, 5  November 2007).
capital has at times ﬂowed in to take advantage of
expected renminbi appreciation,14 leading to a large
ﬁgure for errors and omissions in the 2003–04 balance
of payments (Chart 1). On the other side, Chinese
companies and individuals have transferred capital,
especially to Hong Kong, in part to buy Chinese
shares listed there, which trade at lower prices than in
Shanghai.
China’s Financial System and Its
Linkages Abroad
As the foregoing discussion indicates, China is awash
in capital. Households, ﬁrms, and governments are
prodigious savers. Seventy per cent of Chinese savings
are held in banks, compared with 20 per cent in the
United States (Farrell and Lund 2006).
The ﬁnancial system is bank dominated, and nearly all
banks are majority government owned. The banking
system includes ﬁve large state-owned commercial
banks (SOCBs), a dozen joint stock commercial banks,
more than 100 city commercial banks owned by
municipal governments, and more than 30,000 rural
and urban co-operatives (Table 2). SOCBs dominate
the system, accounting for more than half of banking
assets, thousands of branches, and hundreds of thou-
sands of employees located throughout the country,
14.  “World News: China Vows to Crimp ‘Hot Money,’ Inﬂows,” Wall Street
Journal, 10 March 2007.
Table 2
China’s Banking System, 2007
Billions of RMB
Assets (share) Liabilities (share)
State-owned commercial banksa 28,007 (53.2) 26,433 (53.3)
Joint stock commercial banksb 7,249 (13.8) 6,911 (13.9)
City commercial banks 3,340 (6.4) 3,152 (6.4)
Other banking institutionsc 14,001 (26.6) 13,072 (26.4)
Total 52,598(100.0) 49,568 (100.0)
Source: China Banking Regulatory Commission, “Total Assets and Total
Liabilities of the Banking Institutions as of end–2007.” Available at
<http:  //www.cbrc.gov.cn>.
a. Includes the Industrial and Commercial Bank, the Agricultural Bank of
China, the Bank of China, the China Construction Bank, and the Bank of
Communications.
b. Includes CITIC Industrial Bank, China Everbright Bank, Huaxia Bank,
Guangdong Development Bank, China Merchants Bank, Shanghai Pudong
Development Bank, Industrial Bank, China Minsheng Banking Corp., Ever-
growing Bank, China Zheshang Bank, and China Bohai Bank.
c. Includes policy banks, rural commercial banks, foreign banks, UCCs, RCCs,
ﬁnance companies afﬁliated with enterprise groups, trust and investment
companies, ﬁnancial leasing companies, auto ﬁnancing companies, money
brokers, and postal savings banks.22 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SUMMER 2008
but they are slower growing (15 per cent annually)
than the joint stock banks (33 per cent) and city com-
mercial banks (29 per cent). Privatization is gradually
occurring as equity becomes more widely held by
private investors and foreign strategic investors. In
experimental cases in rural areas, strategic private
investors are being allowed 100 per cent ownership.
China’s capital markets are among the smallest in the
world relative to the size of the domestic economy.
There are two stock exchanges: Shanghai, established
in 1990, and  Shenzhen, in 1991.15 Most of the availa-
ble listings are those of the public shares of China’s
largest state-owned enterprises (SOEs). High levels
of government ownership in these companies and
segmentation of the market have limited market
liquidity. The QFII program, which allows foreign
investors to trade in the domestic market subject to
certain restrictions that include a maximum 10 per
cent equity stake in any domestic company and prohi-
bitions on acquisitions of non-tradable state-owned
shares, is aimed at partially addressing these problems.
China’s bond market is at an even earlier stage of
development, serving mainly as a channel for govern-
ment ﬁnance, owing to the highly restrictive regime
faced by corporate issuers. Although both the central
bank and the Securities Regulatory Commission are
the regulators, the National Development Research
Council, secretariat to the policy-making State Coun-
cil, until recently approved quota allocations and the
issuance of corporate bonds. Banks continue to supply
most debt ﬁnance. By September 2006, corporate
bonds accounted for only 3 per cent of outstanding
bonds, compared with the 68 per cent combined
shares of government and central bank bonds (UBS
2006). Corporate issuers, especially those listed on the
Hong Kong Stock Exchange, are instead tapping into
overseas debt markets.
The government has worked intensively since 1998
to modernize the banking system. In 2000, the China
Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) was created
to oversee retail and wholesale banks.16 As part of the
2001 WTO accession agreement, China agreed to open
the domestic banking sector to foreigners by 2007. To
ensure that banks would be competitive by then, the
government took three steps. The ﬁrst encouraged
15. In 1990, 10 companies had listed on the Shanghai Exchange; by the end of
2006, the number listed on both exchanges had grown to 1,500.
16. The CSRC oversees investment banks. Since the 17th People’s Congress in
October 2007, the formation of a single regulator has been under discussion
(“China Considers Financial Superministry,” Wall Street Journal, 10 January
2008).
restructuring and recapitalization, beginning with the
ﬁve large state banks. By 2005, an estimated half a tril-
lion dollars had been spent to remove bad loans from
banks throughout the system (the Agricultural Bank
of China, still a work in progress, was not included in
this estimate) and to inject fresh capital to bring them
to Basel I levels of capital adequacy (Ma 2006). The
second step encouraged participation of strategic for-
eign investors, not for their capital, but for their exper-
tise and assistance in modernizing the banks. By mid-
2007, some US$20 billion had been invested (Table 3).
The third step, permitting these banks to list some of
their shares on the stock exchanges in Hong Kong and
Shanghai, was intended to encourage transparency
and greater management focus on efficiency and
proﬁtability. These offerings attracted huge investor
interest. The Bank of Communications, which listed in
2005, raised US$2 billion, followed by the Bank of
China and the China Construction Bank, each of
which raised US$9 billion. When ICBC listed late in
2006, it raised an astounding US$19 billion. By one
estimate, these listings, along with domestic listings
in China’s A share market, have raised more than
US$50 billion since 2005 (Anderson 2006).
The government has worked
intensively since 1998 to
modernize the banking system.
These measures are having an impact on bank man-
agement.  Non-performing loans (NPLs) as an indica-
tor of efﬁciency have improved. Among the Big Five
state-owned commercial banks, NPLs dropped from
28.6 per cent (for the original Big Four) in 2000 to
8.05 per cent for the ﬁve in 2007 (CBRC 2007). The
banks have yet to be tested by adverse economic
conditions, however.
Banking-system efﬁciency and competitiveness are
also inhibited by certain institutional features of the
financial system.17 China’s investment-led export-
oriented growth strategy relies on the stability of key
prices, like the exchange rate and interest rates. Since
the 1997–98 East Asian ﬁnancial crisis, the exchange
rate has ﬂuctuated in a very narrow range. It has been
stabilized by the central bank acquiring large foreign
17.  These interconnections are traced in detail in Prasad (2007).23 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SUMMER 2008
exchange earnings from exports and FDI inﬂows and
sterilizing the resulting liquidity. These practices have
reduced the independence of monetary policy. Rather
than allowing banks’ loan and deposit interest rates to
be market determined, the central bank must adminis-
ter them, offering savers low returns and allowing the
banks healthy spreads by setting higher lending rates.
Allowing market-determined rates would be risky,
since the ﬁxed exchange rate is vulnerable to specula-
tive capital inflows, which would put upward pressure
on the exchange rate and require more sterilization.
Administered interest rates were ineffective in slow-
ing growth in 2007, but an outright prohibition on
new lending towards the end of the year did slow
credit expansion.18 Administered interest rates also
reduce commercial banks’ appetite for risky credits
because these banks can rely for a good part of their
income on large well-known borrowers with govern-
ment connections and on the generous administered
spreads between deposit and lending rates.19
Banking-system efﬁciency is also inﬂuenced by con-
tinued government ownership. Since 2004, prudential
standards and oversight have been strengthened and
incentive structures for bank managers have been
modernized. But incentive structures have not changed
sufﬁciently to make the banks’ overlending (mainly to
state-owned enterprises) a thing of the past. The large
banks continue to rely on traditional mainstay bor-
rowers, which are firms, many of them owned or
controlled by the government. According to the large
banks’ own published ﬁnancial statements, corporate
customers still account for between 70 and 80 per cent
of their loans (Dobson and Kashyap 2006). The impli-
cation is that banks are exposed, not to firms with
burgeoning proﬁtability, but to tens of thousands of
government-owned or -controlled ﬁrms whose proﬁts
are likely to be less certain in an economic downturn.
All of this means that governance in China’s majority
government-owned banks is a work in progress that
affectsincentive frameworks. Stepshavebeen takento
increase representation by independent directors on
boards, but the involvement of Communist Party ofﬁ-
cials, while declining, continues to be pervasive. Bank
18. By August 2007, the People’s Bank of China had raised interest rates four
times in its attempt to curb price increases, rising asset values, and over-
capacity in manufacturing, yet the economy expanded nearly 12 per cent in
2007Q2, the strongest growth in 12 years (Zhang Tao, “Deal with Inﬂation,
Currency Threats, Chinese Central Banker Warns,” National Post, 29 August
2007, p. FP18).
19.  Dobson and Kashyap (2006) illustrate the size of the spread and discuss
its impact on bank business plans.
Table 3
Foreign Investments in Chinese Banks
Date Chinese bank Foreign Equity US$
investor share millions
(%)
2002 Shanghai Pudong Citigroup 15 73
Dev Bank
2002 Bank of Shanghai IFC/HSBC 15 145
2002 China Everbright Bank IFC 5 19
2002–05 Bank of Nanjing IFC/BNP 25 114
Paribas
2004 Industrial Bank Hang Seng/ 25 326
IFC/GIC
2004 China Minsheng IFC/Temasek 6 125
Banking Corp.
2004 Shenzhen Development Newbridge 18 150
Bank
2004 Xi’an City Commercial IFC/Scotiabank 25 40
Bank
2005 Jinan City Commercial Commonwealth 11 17
Bank Bank
2005 Bank of Beijing IFC/ING 25 270
2005 Hangzhou City Commonwealth 25 110
Commercial Bank Bank/ADB
2005 Huaxia Bank Deutsche/ 13 325
Sal Oppenheim
2005 Bohai Bank Standard 20 125
Chartered
2005 Bank of HSBC 20 1,750
Communications
2005 China Construction Bank of America/ 14 4,000
Bank Temasek
2005 Bank of China RBS/UBS/ 17 5,175
Temasek/ADB
2005 Tianjin City ANZ 20 110
Commercial Bank
2005 Industrial and Commer- Goldman/ 10 3,700
 cial Bank of China Allianz
2006 Ningbo Commercial OCBC 12 70
Bank
2006 Shanghai Rural ANZ 20 252
Commercial Bank
2006 United Rural Rabobank/IFC 15 30
Cooperative Bank
of Hangzhou
2006 Chongquing City Dah Sing/ 25 130
Commercial Bank Carlyle
2006 Guangdong Citigroup/IBM 25 760
Development Bank
2007 CITIC Industrial Bank BBVA 5 650
2007 Dalian City Commercial Scotiabank/IFC 25 320
Bank
Total 18,786
Source: Ma (2006), IMF, Xinhua, China Daily, UBS estimates24 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SUMMER 2008
headsaremembersoftheCentralCommittee(Naughton
2003); the CEO is often also the party secretary; and
bank performance is discussed at party meetings.
Short-term proﬁtability masks
the problems that lie ahead.
The management, ownership, and governance weak-
nesses mentioned above co-exist with the belief among
investors, depositors, and customers that China’s
government-owned banks are “too big to fail.” The
increasingnumbersofbanks listedonstockexchanges
are subject to more external monitoring, but continued
political pressures undermine their efﬁciency. Indeed,
the economic and credit booms since 2002 have tested
their ability to evaluate and monitor new loans; bank
loanshavesoared(reducingratiosofNPLs)inresponse
to robust demand in expanding industries. Short-term
proﬁtability masks the problems that lie ahead. Such
indicators suggest that banks are also making com-
mercial decisions, but it takes time for these loans to
mature, and should China experience slower growth,
as is increasingly likely in the next few years, non-
performing loans are likely to increase and to create
stress on the banks. Yet depositors believe they have
blanket protection of their deposits, even if the rate of
return is low. The People’s Bank of China is not inde-
pendent, so there is widespread conﬁdence in it as a
lender of last resort.
Once all of the major banks have been restructured,
market forces are likely to be freed up, borrowing and
lendingratesderegulated,interestspreadswillshrink,
investor and depositor monitoring will intensify as
the implicit blanket guarantee is modified or removed,
and banks will face stiffer competition from the devel-
oping capital market institutions. As margins shrink
and balance sheet growth declines, pressures to con-
solidate the banking sector are likely to follow.
In the meantime, banks are ﬂush with cash. The
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC)
and the Bank of China have joined the world’s top
10 banks, as measured by tier one capital,20 and the
government is encouraging banks to “go abroad” to
develop global capabilities. In September 2007, central
20.  “Top 1000 World Banks” (annual), The Banker, July 2007.
bank governor Zhou Xiaochuan outlined the govern-
ment’s supportive policy framework. It includes fos-
tering the development of the foreign exchange
market to help enterprises manage interest rate and
exchange rate risk; reduced controls on foreign
exchange transactions; assistance to qualifying ﬁnan-
cial enterprises to establish overseas operations; and
development of “regional ﬁnancial platforms”
through co-operation with regional development
banks (Zhou 2006).
In the past year, ﬁnancial enterprises have used three
channels for their investments (Table 4). One is to fol-
low their customers into developing countries. In
Asia, which is familiar territory, Chinese banks have
taken large stakes. ICBC has a majority stake in Bank
Halim Indonesia and Macau Seng Hang Bank; Bank of
China owns Singapore Aircraft Leasing outright.
ICBC is following its corporate customers into Africa
and, along with China Development Bank’s China-
Table 4
Foreign Investments Announced  by Chinese
Financial Institutions
Date Chinese bank Target Equity Estimated
stake value (US$
(%) millions)
December Bank of China Singapore 100.0 965
2006 Aircraft
Leasing
December Industrial and Bank 90.0 10
2006 Commercial Halim
Bank of China Indonesia
May 2007 China Invest- Blackstone 9.9 3,000
ment Corpor-
ation
May 2007 CDB China-Africa 100.0 1,000
Development
Fund
July 2007 China Develop- Barclays 3.1 3,100
ment Bank
August 2007 Industrial and Seng Hang 79.9 583
Commercial Bank
Bank of China (Macau)
October 2007 CITIC Bear Stearns* 6.0 1,000
Securities
October 2007 China Minsheng UCBH 9.9 317
Banking Corp. (San Francisco)
October 2007 Industrial and Standard 20.0 5,600
Commercial Bank of
Bank of China South Africa
* Transaction was cancelled because of the takeover of Bear Stearns by
JPMorgan Chase & Co. in March 2008.
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Africa Development Fund, is ﬁnancing infrastructure
and building ties with African governments and
enterprises in China’s search for natural resources and
new markets. ICBC’s investment in Standard Bank of
South Africa, Africa’s largest bank, gives it a platform
with an experienced partner to assist its penetration of
an unfamiliar geography.
The second channel is to take stakes in more sophisti-
cated banks in the United Kingdom and the United
States to increase international competitiveness by
learning advanced banking technologies and prod-
ucts. In these cases, the stakes are small, in part to
avoid political friction. The fates of the ﬁrst four
investments are mixed and suggest that there is still
much to learn. In October 2007, CITIC Securities
agreed to acquire 6 per cent of Bear Stearns, the U.S.
investment bank struggling with its mortgage busi-
ness, which would provide a 2 per cent stake in CITIC
in return. When Bear Stearns became insolvent in
March 2008 and JPMorgan Chase stepped in as its
acquirer, CITIC Securities cancelled its deal. China
Investment Corporation (CIC) took a stake in the IPO
of Blackstone, the U.S. private equity ﬁrm, in May
2007. CIC was widely criticized in Beijing for having
paid too much when the share price dropped following
the IPO. China Development Bank’s July 2007 invest-
ment in Barclays included an agreement to invest fur-
ther if Barclays’ bid for ABN-Amro succeeded (it did
not). The one investment that appears to be structured
for successful learning and partnership is China
Minsheng Bank’s stake in UCBH Holdings (a San
Francisco-based bank that focuses on the ethnic
Chinese population in the United States and abroad),
acquired in October 2007. Each party acquires the
right to board representation in the other, and Minsheng
can increase its investment in the future if it receives
U.S. regulatory approval.
The third channel for foreign investment is market
entry through a banking licence. Both ICBC and China
Merchants Bank have applied to the Federal Reserve
for U.S. banking licences but have been met with cau-
tion, reportedly because of concerns about govern-
ance, transparency, and the absence of a legal frame-
work to deal with money laundering. The CBRC has
indicated a linkage between the Chinese government’s
stance on opening wider the door to foreign investors
in China’s banks and the willingness of other govern-
ments to grant banking licences to Chinese applicants.21
21.  “Beijing in Call for US Banking Licenses,” Financial Times, 24 September
2007.
In summary,  with variable success, Chinese ﬁnancial
institutions have used their growing foreign linkages
primarily as a means to increase their efﬁciency and
competitiveness. As China’s ﬁnancial system is fur-
ther modernized, the banks will face stiffer domestic
competition, which will reduce margins and shrink
balance sheets, likely resulting in domestic consolida-
tion in the years ahead. It is reasonable to expect,
therefore, that only the strongest “brand” candidates
will likely be permitted to participate in China’s “go
abroad” drive. Even then, the available evidence sug-
gests that there is still much to be learned about oper-
ating outside of East Asia. Initial investments are still
small in ﬁnancial terms, but they incur reputational
risks and add operational complexity. As the domestic
environment becomes more competitive, even adverse,
banks’ abilities to manage these international invest-
ments will be tested.
China’s Exchange Rate Regime
Most large economies have ﬂexible exchange rates,
which free up the central bank to pursue domestic
objectives. Pegged exchange rates in a context of
highly mobile capital can be fragile, because they can
be subject at times to strong speculative pressures for
a devaluation or revaluation. The crises in the Euro-
pean Monetary System and in Mexico and East Asia in
the 1990s have led most of the larger emerging-market
economies to abandon exchange rate pegs and embrace
exchange rate ﬂexibility—if not complete ﬂexibility in
all cases. China retains extensive capital controls and
has a managed exchange rate, but has embraced the
principle of greater exchange rate ﬂexibility.
The evolution of China’s exchange rate regime has
been gradual. In 1994, the official and parallel22
exchange markets were uniﬁed, and the ofﬁcial RMB–
dollar exchange rate was devalued sharply following
a period of sustained inﬂation and loss of interna-
tional competitiveness.  The exchange rate has been
stable since then, particularly during the turbulent
period of the Asian crises in 1997–98.23 On 21 July
2005, a managed ﬂoating exchange rate regime was
introduced, and the RMB was allowed to move within
a narrow range in reference to an unspeciﬁed basket
of currencies. Recognizing that Chinese enterprises
22.  Applying to non-trade transactions not ofﬁcially encouraged, and taking
place at a more depreciated exchange rate.
23. China’s decision not to engage in competitive devaluation to match those
of its regional trading partners was widely appreciated in the region, earning
China political dividends.26 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SUMMER 2008
including central bank governor  Zhou Xiaochuan,
balancing China’s trade will not by itself resolve the
problem of the U.S. current account deﬁcit, which
reﬂects a fundamental savings-investment imbalance.
In an attempt to coordinate a solution to the problem
of global imbalances, the International Monetary
Chart 3
China’s Trade and Current Account Balance as a
Percentage of GDP
%
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics (1990–2006), China,
SAFE, downloaded from CEIC data (2007)
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would have to learn to manage associated exchange
rate risks, new instruments were introduced to enhance
the operations of the foreign exchange market, including
an over-the-counter market and foreign exchange and
interest rate swaps. From that date until the end of
May 2008, the RMB has appreciated by 14.4 per cent in
terms of the U.S. dollar, but much less in real effective
terms (since most other major currencies have appre-
ciated against the dollar) despite China’s large and
growing trade surpluses and substantial capital
inﬂows (Chart 2).
Since 1992, China has increasingly become a magnet
for foreign investors attracted to its large domestic
market and abundant supplies of low-cost, educated
labour. China is now the world’s third-largest trading
nation, exporting labour-intensive manufactures
assembled there and importing natural resources,
manufactured components, and capital-intensive
goods. The speed and magnitude of China’s export
growth has contributed to a large trade surplus,
averaging about 9 per cent of GDP in 2006 and 2007
(Chart 3).
Chinese government concerns about
the domestic consequences of large
or rapid revaluation are paramount.
In this context, China’s stable exchange rate is the sub-
ject of prolonged international debate. Some call for
greater exchange rate ﬂexibility (Eichengreen 2005),
while others call for a one-time revaluation (Goldstein
and Lardy 2006). China’s trade gains, which have not
been reﬂected in a substantial appreciation of its cur-
rency, have come from its comparative abundance of
low-cost labour whose productivity is growing. To the
Chinese government, concerns about the domestic
consequences of large or rapid revaluation are para-
mount; namely, fear of disruptive adjustment for
exporters of labour-intensive manufactures and risks
to the low-productivity agricultural sector (on which
large numbers of Chinese still depend for employ-
ment) from increased import competition.
Large Chinese surpluses need to be seen in the context
of global imbalances and, in particular, large U.S. cur-
rent account deﬁcits.24 As many have pointed out,
24.  IMF (2007a). For additional insights on why global imbalances are a
source of concern, see Dodge (2006a, b) and Little and Lafrance (2006).27 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SUMMER 2008
Fund has begun multilateral discussions with key
players (IMF 2007b). For their part, high-level U.S.
and Chinese ofﬁcials have met many times to try to
resolve their differences with respect to trade imbal-
ances and the RMB-dollar exchange rate but, to date,
agreement on speciﬁc measures has been limited.
China’s emphasis on exchange rate stability in the face
of rising current account surpluses has forced the cen-
tral bank to accumulate massive foreign exchange
reserves, producing unfavourable domestic conse-
quences as well as generating protectionist pressures
abroad.
The accumulation of international reserves on a cen-
tralbank’sbalancesheettypicallyﬁndsitscounterpart
in monetary expansion, unless these reserves are steri-
lized, i.e., are not allowed to affect the domestic econ-
omy.25 Sterilization may levy a heavy ﬁscal cost and
introduce distortions into domestic ﬁnancial systems
(Mohanty and Turner 2005). The fiscal costs stem
from the fact that the yields on sterilization bonds are
typically higher than the returns earned on foreign
reserves. While this has not been a problem for China,
the recent fall in short-term U.S. Treasury rates has
increased the ﬁnancial burden on the central bank.
Moreover, China is exposed to large capital losses on
its foreign reserve holdings (which are believed to be
largely held in U.S. dollars) as the RMB appreciates.
For these reasons, a key issue for China, given its cur-
rent level of integration into the international ﬁnancial
system, is when and how to change the exchange rate
regime. Eichengreen et al. (1999) argue that interna-
tional experience shows that the best time to exit from
a ﬁxed exchange rate is while capital is ﬂowing into a
country. By adopting a de facto (as well as a de jure)
ﬂexible exchange rate, China would gain greater lev-
erage to limit deviations of inﬂation and growth from
chosen targets by means of a monetary policy geared
to domestic objectives. An independent monetary pol-
icy would allow interest rates to be market determined,
which would help in modernizing the banking sys-
tem, as discussed above. Such a policy does not imply
neglecting the exchange rate; it may involve interven-
ing in the exchange market to limit short-run currency
ﬂuctuations, but not to resist longer-term trends.
25.  There are two main ways to sterilize foreign reserves: either by reinvest-
ing the funds directly abroad, which is basically what a sovereign wealth
fund does; or by draining funds from the national banking system by forcing
them to hold either government or central bank bonds. So far, China has
mainly relied on the latter method, although it has recently created a special
fund for foreign investments, the China Investment Corporation, with an ini-
tial endowment of US$200 billion.
Eichengreen (2005) points out that a rapid transition to
a more ﬂexible exchange rate is not an argument for
rapid capital account liberalization. History is replete
with examples of countries that have operated man-
aged floats while retaining capital controls (e.g.,
Europe in the 1930s, Japan in the 1970s, Chile in the
1990s, Brazil and India today).
A key issue for China is when
and how to change the
exchange rate regime.
Greater exchange rate ﬂexibility would facilitate the
liberalization of the capital account by better prepar-
ing the economy to deal with the impact of increased
volatility associated with freer capital ﬂows. One of
the main lessons China drew from the Asian ﬁnancial
crisis is that ﬁnancial system development and capital
account liberalization should be carefully sequenced
to allow for the institutional development necessary
to manage the additional risks. Studies of countries’
experiences have demonstrated that capital account
liberalization has to be supported by a combination of
sound macroeconomic policies to contain aggregate
ﬁnancial imbalances and sound prudential policies,
backed by adequate supervision of the ﬁnancial sys-
tem, to ensure proper incentives for risk management
(Eichengreen et al. 1998). In summary, the adoption of
a monetary policy aimed at domestic objectives would
facilitate various reforms that would contribute to
China’s central domestic goals, a sound and diverse
ﬁnancial system, and greater transparency and effec-
tiveness of monetary policy in its pursuit of low inﬂa-
tion.
Conclusions
China is considerably less integrated into the global
ﬁnancial system than its importance as an investment
destination and major exporting country might sug-
gest. These features are best understood in the context
of China’s overarching domestic priorities to create
sufﬁcient modern-sector jobs as it restructures the
economy and moves people out of low-productivity
agriculture while maintaining political and social sta-
bility. China’s rapid economic development is likely to
lead to substantially more ﬁnancial integration in
coming decades, however, as China invests more28 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SUMMER 2008
abroad, develops its domestic ﬁnancial system, and
relaxes further its capital controls.
The question of the proper sequencing of domestic
ﬁnancial reforms, exchange rate ﬂexibility, and capital
account liberalization naturally arises. Capital con-
trols protect Chinese banks from the risks of foreign
currency mismatches that were so harmful to the
ﬁnancial systems of the countries affected by the
Asian crisis during the late 1990s.26 Outward FDI by
Chinese banks and SOEs will require further capital
account liberalization, however, as Chinese banks also
increase their foreign currency business with Chinese
companies.
A stable RMB has helped to further the development
of China’s industrial base, but the managed exchange
rate regime has constrained monetary policy, a prob-
lem that still needs to be addressed. Greater exchange
rate ﬂexibility, allowing a faster appreciation and
reducing currency undervaluation, will be necessary
to encourage Chinese enterprises to rely more on pro-
ductivity than on price competitiveness in interna-
tional markets, to prevent further accumulation of
reserves, and to defuse growing protectionist pres-
sures, particularly in the United States and Europe.
While capital account liberalization is likely to con-
tinue, leading to greater integration with the global
ﬁnancial system, some elements should be postponed
until domestic institutions have further developed
their abilities to assess and mitigate risks; supervision
and regulation are strengthened; and domestic ﬁnan-
cial markets develop further.
26.  Principally Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Korea.
Much will depend on whether
the Chinese authorities are
interested in seeing the currency
in wide international use.
A more distant issue is when and whether the Chinese
currency will play a role on the world stage that is
comparable to the size and rate of growth of China’s
trade (Dobson and Masson 2008). At present, the RMB
is not used outside of China except for a modest
amount of renminbi balances held at Hong Kong
banks. The ﬁrst step towards more international use of
the currency can be expected in East Asia, where it is
likely to be used for invoicing and settlement of trade.
As capital controls are gradually liberalized, the next
step might be the growth in foreign holdings of RMB-
denominated assets, followed by RMB borrowing by
foreigners in China’s capital markets. In the long run,
however, much will depend on whether the Chinese
authorities are interested in seeing the currency in
wide international use. This is still an open question,
but it can be argued that, even if the authorities were
interested, the RMB will not gain international impor-
tance until China has a sophisticated and sound
domestic ﬁnancial system buttressed by an independ-
ent central bank, a ﬂexible exchange rate, and open
capital markets.
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